Butler's Gender Theory

Identity is not stable—this is a fundamental idea in the work of poststructuralists such as Foucault, Derrida, and Butler. In her article, “Imitation and Gender Insubordination” Butler calls “identity categories…sites of necessary trouble” and explains her own issues with identity categorizations, which constructs taxonomies for women, men, gay, lesbian, transgendered, “closeted”, and “out-of-the closet” persons. This is also true for countless other taxonomies—which would include constructions of race, religion, body types, and more (124). It may be precisely this troubling nature of identity categories that make them so interesting to study and illuminate. Are we who we are classified as, or is there much more to this? Don’t classifications serve to reduce social uncertainty so we can “understand” differences and “otherness”? I would posit that categories are necessary by their ability to designate a language for identifying difference, but they do not help us understand difference any better than a cat could understand arithmetic.  For can’t an individual be Multiple identifications at once?  Such as “pursuing homosexual aims within heterosexual practices” and vice versa as Butler points out, and can’t a person shift in their aims over time (and in different contexts) to pursue other aims within another set of practices?

Further, who are we to classify what is real and unreal? What is reasonable and what is unreasonable? Aren’t these classifications unique to each person? That is—individuals and groups seem to be very divided on what constitutes reality and reason. I’m not touting a moral relativism here. I’m simply highlighting the idea of a space between this “split” between what is real and what is unreal and what’s reasonable and unreasonable (Huffer). Such ideals of heterosexuality exist in the realm of reality and reason until two lesbians attempt to live heterosexual identifications (e.g. a home, marriage, and family in suburbia with 2.5 kids and a garage) within homosexual practices (e.g. two female parents).  They are labeled as simply “miming” the practices of heterosexual families to which this identification belongs. Thus, they are seen to exist in the realm of the “unreal.” Further gay men often belong to the realm of “unreason” as their identities are often seen “as objects of prohibition”, a form of madness and obscenity (128).  Individuals who dress in drag or change their sexes are further classified as “unreal” and “unreasonable” for they are viewed merely as imitations or impersonations of the real and reasonable “feminine” belonging to the female, and the real and reasonable “masculine” belonging to the male. This split helps us to see how gender performance becomes compulsively performed by many individuals and groups (130). There are serious consequences that result from going against what is considered “real” and “reasonable” that result in oppressive exclusion for those who act outside the boundaries of constructed identity. Excluded people are said to belong to “subcultures” or some unoriginal version of the main and original “culture”. This space between reason and unreason and the real and the unreal is a space where everyone in actuality falls. For “reason” and “unreason”, “real” and the “unreal” classificatory splits are constructions—which simply exist for the sake of socio-political comfort and “certainty” which reduces social anxiety surrounding “otherness”.

I really enjoyed both readings as they got to the heart of “sex” as regulated through socio-political ideals of gender and sexuality, which are compulsively performed as material products of power. Butler is such a poignant and gifted poststructural mind. I hope to read more from her library before the culmination of this class.  

Supplemental Reference

Huffer, Lynne. Mad for Foucault. New York: Columbia U P, 2010. Print.